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Abstract 
Rising immigration rates in Western Europe concur with increasing anti-immigrant attitudes. 
While assessments of welfare eligibility in the United States demonstrably hinge on how public 
servants perceive different racial groups as deserving, we know less about ethnically motivated 
discrimination in the European context. This paper argues that Switzerland is a critical case for 
studying such developments. It combines social construction theory and the deservingness 
heuristic to analyze how social constructions of Swiss natives and immigrants influence 90 
disability benefits insurance procedures. Findings reveal that immigrants are perceived as less 
deserving and less powerful than Swiss applicants. Thus, Swiss welfare workers do not allocate 
welfare benefits independently of an applicant’s nationality. Our results raise fundamental 
questions about the equal treatment of welfare applicants in times of rising immigration and 
anti-immigrant attitudes. The feed-forward effects of social constructions imply longer-term 
consequences for good administrative practices and society that require scholarly attention. 
Keywords: deservingness, discrimination, frontline implementation, immigrants, social 
construction of target groups, social equity, welfare chauvinism  
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Introduction 
This paper assesses how the social construction of immigrant and native applicants affects the 
frontline delivery of welfare policy in Switzerland. Recent developments in Western societies 
have demonstrated that increasing immigration rates fuel competition over scarce resources 
between the majority and immigrant population (van der Waal, de Koster and van Oorschot 
2013). This has particular implications for welfare policies, which are, first and foremost, 
concerned with the question of “who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell 2012). This article 
analyses how these issues translate into public action. In the discretionary practice of 
administrative welfare procedures, societal solidarity manifests itself through the concrete 
allocation of benefits and services for those seeking public assistance. Here, the judgments, 
decisions, and actions of frontline welfare workers become decisive (Brodkin 1997; Lipsky 
1980; Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie 2001). The equal treatment of clients is one of the basic 
principles of good administrative practice, representing the values of fairness and democratic 
accountability (Frederickson 1990). However, there is ample evidence that client 
characteristics generally play an influential role in the awarding of welfare benefits and services 
because “bureaucrats with discretion can act according to their own biases” (Einstein and Glick 
2016, 2). The question arises whether presumably technical bureaucracies implement welfare 
policies independently of the applicant’s nationality. 
In this context, “the social construction of target populations has a powerful influence on public 
officials” (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 334). Stereotypes about the power and deservingness 
of target groups explain inequalities in both the distribution and allocation of benefits (Ingram, 
Schneider, and DeLeon 2007; Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 2004; Pierce et al. 2014; 
Schneider and Ingram 1997; Schneider and Sidney 2009). Particularly in the context of the 
United States, racial bias in policy delivery is amply documented (DiAlto 2005; Einstein and 
3 
 
Glick 2016; Epp et al. 2017; Frederickson 1990; Gooden 2006; Johnson 2012; Liang 2016; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2012; Monnat 2010; Moynihan and Herd 2010; Piatak 2016; 
Schram, Soss, and Fording 2010; Yoo 2008). In contrast, much less is known about the role of 
nationality and race in welfare delivery in the European context. It has been argued that the 
different institutional-cultural contexts within which continental Western European welfare 
programs operate might even reverse discriminatory behavior (Terum et al. 2017). European 
welfare systems lack many of the institutional features that trigger discrimination in the United 
States (see Epp et al. 2017): they tend to redistribute income at larger scales and have more 
generous as well as less fragmented social programs that are less exclusively targeted at ethnic 
minorities. Caseworkers are more professionalized and better educated, they can typically 
make use of language interpretation services, and are often more sensitized to cultural issues 
(Smedley et al. 2002; Terum et al. 2017). 
Despite these differences, it is premature to assume that racial or ethnic bias is not an issue in 
Western European bureaucracies. As Garand et al. (2017) show, rising immigration rates shift 
perceptions of welfare deservingness from questions of race to questions of nationality. The 
aforementioned developments highlight the salience of such issues for Western Europe. Taking 
care of the disabled and (incurably) ill lies at the core of every society’s welfare policy. We 
generally tend to see the vulnerable as most deserving. Yet increasing levels of immigration 
also raise the belief that immigrants’ main motivation is to take advantage of these benefits 
reserved for the truly needy. This challenges the majority’s overall solidarity with immigrants 
and leads to welfare chauvinism. Such preferences for more generous welfare entitlements for 
native citizens are driven by the way in which people perceive different societal groups as 
deserving (Boräng 2015; Jensen and Petersen 2016; Petersen et al. 2011; Petersen 2012; van 
Oorschot 2000; 2006). Against this background, cultural-institutional differences in welfare 
systems may not be able to mitigate biased decisions of welfare workers. 
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As a result, disability insurances are often part of public and political debates concerning 
potential frauds and exploitations of this pension system which result in significant pressures 
on caseworkers. This also applies to the present case under study, namely the allocation of 
disability benefits in Switzerland in the period from 2003-2008. Switzerland is an early case 
for high immigration rates, rising anti-immigrant attitudes, and their mobilization through 
right-wing populist parties, taking place now, to varying degrees, all over Europe (Manatschal 
and Rapp 2015; Sager and Thomann 2016). Additionally, its cultural, linguistic, religious, and 
regional diversity make Switzerland a microcosm of Europe (Freitag and Rapp 2013, 440). 
Against this background, the paper addresses two crucial questions: What social constructions 
can we find in Swiss welfare delivery? And how do these social constructions affect the way 
in which welfare benefits are granted to applicants?  
To this end, we overcome disciplinary boundaries and combine social construction theory with 
insights from public opinion, policy design, and implementation research to formulate concrete 
expectations about the welfare procedures of applicants from different origins. We make use 
of a unique data set comprising welfare case files of disability benefit procedures of 48 Swiss 
citizens and 42 immigrant applicants, which were coded based on in-depth content analyses of 
disability insurance case documentations (Bolliger et al. 2010). The results, based on cluster 
and regression analyses, reveal how social constructions of immigrants significantly shape the 
perceptions and decisions of the actors involved in these procedures. We conclude by 
discussing important implications for social equity in welfare delivery in times of rising anti-
immigrant attitudes.  
The case of Swiss disability insurance 
Switzerland is a particularly interesting case to extend social equity research beyond the United 
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States. While Switzerland shares the above-mentioned institutional features of Western 
European welfare systems, its welfare system is often considered to be closer to the US system 
than other continental European welfare regimes (Armingeon 2001). Disability benefits 
allocation in Switzerland is also a critical case for revealing the tension between solidarity for 
the needy and welfare chauvinism. Switzerland has continually had high levels of immigration 
and anti-immigrant attitudes, as expressed in the recent popular votes against immigrant rights 
(Freitag and Rapp 2013; Rapp 2015). Swiss disability benefit statistics further show that the 
risk of disability is, on average, higher for immigrants than for Swiss citizens (Bolliger et al. 
2010). In the mid-2000s, these numbers fostered ongoing public debates on the alleged 
exploitation of the welfare state by migrants, political contestation, and immense media 
scrutiny on welfare agencies.  
Swiss disability insurance defines disability as the continuing full or partial loss of the ability 
to take up employment due to impaired health resulting from illness or accident in spite of 
reasonable treatment and rehabilitation. The insurance uses rehabilitation measures or financial 
support to ensure the livelihoods of those who suffer from disabilities. It is eligible for everyone 
suffering from disability, regardless if caused by birth or by accident. Every person residing 
and working in Switzerland can apply for disability benefits, yet the largest target group are 
low-skilled manufactural workers. The approval of disability benefits relies on three points: 
First, an individual’s risk of illness or accident; second, the (in)capacity to continue to work or 
to be reintegrated into work; and third, the outcome of the disability benefit procedure 
(Wyssmueller and Efionayi 2007). The procedure follows the principle of “rehabilitation 
before pension” – meaning that the primary goal is to improve the earning capacity of 
applicants. Cash benefits are only granted when all rehabilitation options have been exhausted.   
In response to the above-mentioned concerns and austerity pressures, the Disability Insurance 
Act enacted tighter criteria to ensure that benefits are strictly awarded based, first and foremost, 
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on purely medical criteria. If rehabilitation failed, the purpose of the procedure was to evaluate 
an objective “percentage” of incapacity to work. Obviously, the personal history (e.g., 
socioeconomic status, biographical stress factors) as well as individual attitudes and behavior 
(e.g., language skills, socio-cultural conceptions of health and illness, readiness to continue 
working, presentation of symptoms) shape the pathway towards disability. However, legally, 
the benefit decision had to be strictly dissociated from such non-disability (e.g. psychosocial) 
factors. Restrictive criteria, in particular, applied to health problems difficult to diagnose 
medically, such as somatoform pain disorders. As a result, disability insurance officials and 
medical advisors had to take tough decisions about the allocation of benefits. This political and 
legal context leads us to expect that prevailing perceptions of applicants of different 
nationalities have an observable influence on the benefit application procedures and their 
outcomes. 
Social constructions in welfare policy delivery 
Both experimental and field research suggests that persisting stereotypes, in terms of simplified 
cognitive representations of how members of a distinct group are similar or different from 
members of other groups, provoke discrimination of immigrants during service delivery, 
especially in interaction with gender (Brodkin 1993; Einstein and Glick 2016; Fineman 1998; 
Gooden 2006; Grohs, Adam, and Knill 2016; Johnson 2012; Liang 2016; Lipsky 1980; Monnat 
2010; Moynihan and Herd 2010; Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Piatak, 2015; 
Schram, Soss, and Fording 2010; Watkin-Hayes 2009). Normative individual assessments of 
deservingness become particularly salient when welfare agents need to cope with austerity 
pressures that force them to prioritize some clients over others (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 
2012; Tummers et al. 2015). Political economists have proposed several theoretical 
explanations. For example, taste-based discrimination approaches assume that individuals 
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prefer certain groups over others; that is, individuals have certain incorporated prejudices 
(Allport 1954; Becker 1971). Conversely, the theory of “statistical discrimination” assumes 
that rational and non-prejudiced agents – like frontline workers – make decisions on the 
grounds of specific individual and group based attributes and behaviors (Arrow 1998; Grohs, 
Adam, and Knill 2016; Phelps 1972).  
In contrast, social construction theory assumes that stereotypes are neither the result of 
individual preferences nor of typical attributes and behavior, but are due to the fact that some 
groups, through evaluative and normative cultural characterizations and popular images, are 
portrayed more positively or negatively in society (Schneider and Ingram 1993).1 Perceived 
group images direct the treatment of the respective societal group and explain why public 
policies sometimes fail to produce greater equality of citizenship (Ingram, Schneider, and 
DeLeon 2007, 93). Social constructions refer to value-based cultural images about particular 
groups of people targeted by a policy, in particular, “(1) the recognition of the shared 
characteristics that distinguish a target population as socially meaningful, and (2) the attribution 
of specific, valence-oriented values, symbols, and images to the characteristics” (Schneider and 
Ingram 1993, 335). Such stereotypes are measurable empirical phenomena, created by politics, 
culture, socialization, history, the media, religion, literature, and the like.  
Social constructions pervade all aspects of political reality and interact with the perceptions of 
citizens (Pierce et al. 2014). Individual behavior and decision-making can therefore be directed 
by existing stereotypes “without personally endorsing such stereotypes, without feelings of 
                                                 
1 Stereotypes refer to the prevailing public image, whereas prejudice is a purely individual attitude. Stereotypes 
may emerge from persisting prejudice; yet, this is not necessarily the case. Moreover, stereotypes may influence 
the opinions and behavior of individuals without prejudice against specific groups (Vescio and Weaver 2013).  
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prejudice, and without awareness that such stereotypes could affect one’s judgement and 
behavior” (Vescio and Weaver 2013, 1). We hence expect that frontline workers - without 
necessarily being truly aware of it - may rely on these mental shortcuts when making policy-
decisions. As Epp et al. (2017: 169, 173) highlight, such implicit biases go beyond the problem 
of taste-based discrimination, where individual beliefs or attitudes affect choices. The unit of 
variation of social constructions is society, not the individual. As a “part of the social heritage 
of a society”, they influence “automatic” mental processes. Even people who do not 
consciously share this bias may perpetuate the resulting discriminating structures and practices.  
Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2005, 228) identify three basic conditions for a socially 
constructed group image: “first the presence of a readily identifiable and socially marginal 
group with a value-laden stereotype. Second, a moral entrepreneur must focus public attention 
and fear on the actions of that group. Finally, there must be sufficient political profit to entice 
a policy champion to place the issue on the political agenda and work to secure passage of a 
targeted policy”. These three criteria apply to the Swiss case. The public image of immigrants, 
and in particular of low-skilled or culturally different immigrants, is very negative in 
Switzerland. Popular images are those of the welfare cheater, the criminal Yugoslavian, or 
include the general fear that immigrants take away resources such as jobs and welfare benefits 
from the Swiss population (Rapp 2015). The main moral entrepreneur driving the narrative of 
alleged “welfare fraud” by immigrants is the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). It continuously 
frames the public and political discourse on immigrants through pushing forward public votes 
and policies against foreigners. SVP politicians draw on “emotional and value-laden images 
and symbols rather than objective representations of ‘reality’” (Schneider, Ingram, and DeLeon 
2014, 106) to justify their strong anti-immigrant position. Regularly used negatively connoted 
images – such as the black sheep threatening social cohesion in Switzerland (Manatschal and 
Rapp, 2015) - may transform themselves into persisting stereotypes that define how both the 
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public and policymakers perceive immigrants. The last condition is fulfilled since disability 
benefits are highly competitive and open to the general public. In this paper, we empirically 
illustrate the social construction of immigrants and its implications for the course of welfare 
benefit allocation in Switzerland.  
Expectations 
Social constructions are not exogenously given, but subject to change and contentious societal 
discourses and highly policy-dependent (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 336). Swiss citizens and 
immigrants do not represent homogenous groups. We draw on both the literature on public 
support for social spending and the literature on questions of deservingness to empirically 
define, refine, and identify the dimensions of deservingness and power in the context of 
disability benefits in Switzerland.  
Power 
Schneider and Ingram (1993) define a powerful group as one that has a potential societal and/or 
political impact, whereby the impact mainly derives from the mere size of the group; their 
wealth; political resources, such as votes; and their ability to mobilize others (Pierce et al. 2014; 
Schneider, Ingram, and DeLeon 2014). The political power of (non-naturalized) immigrants in 
Switzerland is very limited as they are not eligible to vote in elections or popular votes. The 
Swiss immigration and integration laws further diminish the power of immigrants as they have 
almost no possibility to take part in political action. Accordingly, we assume that Swiss citizens 
are per se more powerful than immigrants. Apart from political power, well-educated 
individuals are considered as powerful, whereas disabled persons, women and families with 
many children are considered as less influential (Ingram, Schneider, and DeLeon 2007; 
Petersen et al. 2011; Schneider and Ingram 1993; Schneider and Ingram 1997; van Oorschot 
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2006). In addition, elderly individuals are more likely to actively take part in the political 
process (Schneider, Ingram, and DeLeon 2014). Accordingly, we expect that the most powerful 
target group of disability benefits are elderly Swiss males who tend to have a good education.  
 
Deservingness 
A growing literature examines who and why specific societal groups are generally considered 
more deserving of receiving welfare benefits than others (Newton 2005; Petersen 2012; 
Petersen et al. 2011; van Oorschot 2000; Yoo 2008). The level of need and the reasons why a 
person is in a needy situation determine deservingness. Persons are seen as the most deserving 
if they are in general need, for example elderly or sick persons, or if they are not responsible 
for their situation, for instance having a severe illness by birth or through an accident or being 
mentally disabled. Conversely, people responsible for their neediness and who constantly 
complain about their situation range the lowest on the deservingness hierarchy (Einstein and 
Glick 2016; van Oorschot 2006).  
Undoubtedly, however, the most determining factor of deservingness is a shared social or 
national identity (van Oorschot 2006). Social groups identify themselves as in- and out-groups 
based on social categorization along distinct cleavage lines, such as race, ethnicity, and 
citizenship (Tajfel 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Social categorization processes, meaning 
“our tendency to divide the world into two distinct categories, ‘us’ and ‘them’”, result in 
discriminatory attitudes and behavior between groups (Crepaz and Damron 2009, 445). 
Individuals perceive their in-group, that is, the majority within a given country, as superior to 
an existing out-group, such as immigrants or ethnically diverse groupings. As a result, citizens 
are generally viewed as more eligible for welfare support than non-natives. Moreover, 
immigrants are often evaluated and differentiated based on their ethnic origin. In this ethnic 
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hierarchy, the more culturally diverse immigrants – compared with the majority of the 
population – should range the lowest on the deservingness axis. In contrast, culturally similar 
immigrants are considered as more deserving. In the Swiss case, the cultural similarity 
distinction is drawn between European and non-European immigrants (Rapp 2015).  
We hence expect that severely ill, especially mentally ill, individuals as well as the elderly are 
generally considered as more deserving of welfare benefits.2 In contrast, immigrants – 
particularly non-European immigrants – are considered as less eligible and deserving of public 
welfare support.  
 
Procedure 
Both public actors and welfare recipients internalize prevailing social constructions. These then 
shape their perceptions of the legitimacy of claims and needs, interactions, trust, and 
expectations (Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle 2015; Schneider and Sidney 2009). Different social 
constructions of Swiss and immigrant applicants should hence affect the welfare procedure in 
terms of its conflict potential and length. According to Schneider and Ingram (1993, 342ff), 
public actors often treat the contenders who are negatively constructed but powerful with 
suspicion rather than respect: the government is not really interested in resolving their 
problems. Because contenders will defend themselves, conflictual interaction is common. As 
contenders feel that no one will take care of them except for themselves, they use power, 
manipulation, and subterfuge. Similarly, deviants will have mainly negative experiences when 
interacting with government officials. “The dominant messages are that they are bad people 
whose behavior constitutes a problem for others (…)  Orientations will be those of angry and 
                                                 
2 Age is both a power and deservingness indicator.   
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oppressed people who have no faith in government's fairness or effectiveness. They see 
themselves as alone and as individual players who have no chance of winning in a game that 
they view as essentially corrupt” (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 342). Conversely, interactions 
between government officials and positively constructed target groups tend to be more 
favorable and fair, in particular for the advantaged, who are also powerful. 
 
Welfare benefit allocation 
Social construction theory contends that “there are strong pressures for public officials to 
provide beneficial policy to powerful, positively constructed target populations and to devise 
punitive, punishment-oriented policy for negatively constructed groups” (Schneider and 
Ingram 1993, 334). The perceived social constructions might affect the evaluations and 
interactions between actors involved in the admission procedure, leading to a biased allocation 
of welfare benefits – that is, the outcomes of welfare policy delivery (Schneider and Ingram 
1993, 337ff; Schneider and Sidney 2009). Benefits tend to be allocated to positively 
constructed, powerful populations, whereas negatively constructed groups will receive less 
benefits (Steinacker 2006). We expect these mechanisms to be particularly pronounced for the 
group of deviants. Frontline workers may fear the power of contenders and be more benevolent 
towards them in allocating social benefits.  
In sum, we expect that both the process and allocation of disability benefits in Switzerland are 
driven by the social construction of target groups, whereby immigrants should generally be 
treated less generously than Swiss citizens – depending on a group’s position on both the 
deservingness and power axes.  
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Data and methods 
The data for this study stems from a commissioned research project for the Swiss Federal Social 
Insurance Office (FSIO) in the year 2009 (Bolliger et al. 2010). Our sample comprises 90 case 
files, of which 48 are Swiss nationals and 42 are non-naturalized immigrants from either 
Turkey (N=10) or the former Yugoslavia (N=32).3 While this sample is not representative of 
the Swiss population, it draws a very precise picture of the “typical” disability benefit applicant. 
All 90 applicants are males with a rather low socio-economic background, ranging in age 
between 35 and 59, who were trained and working in manual jobs, were employed full-time, 
and diagnosed with a severe physical illness or injury. Men over 40 years old who have worked 
a manual job account for the largest part of disability benefit recipients in Switzerland. This 
quasi-most similar systems design focuses on a rather powerless segment of the population in 
terms of income and type of work, and controls for important determinants of disability 
(gender, state of health, and professional background). It offers the advantage of holding 
constant many intervening factors to facilitate a more controlled assessment of the existence 
and impact of the social construction of immigrants and natives. Table A3 in the online 
appendix reveals that there are no significant differences between the groups except that Swiss 
citizens have a slightly higher average education than immigrants.  
The 90 applicants were selected in a three-step procedure, based on a full sample of all male 
applicants in the three cantons (regions) of Zurich, Bern and Vaud. Together, these three 
cantons account for one third of all disability benefits in Switzerland. They represent the 
national diversity in terms of language, rural and urban regions, healthcare coverage, economic 
                                                 
3 Three immigrants in our sample hold Swiss citizenship, thus, we counted them as Swiss citizens instead of 
immigrants.  
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structure, unemployment, public spending, wealth and the share of immigrants. First, 
unsuitable cases were sorted out based on statistical data about the applicant’s health issue and 
career. Second, we drew a random sample of 100 case files in each canton from the remaining 
cases, which were then sorted in a random order. Third, we sequentially checked each case for 
its compatibility with the above outlined “most similar” criteria until the number of 15 Swiss 
and immigrant applicants (ethnicity) was reached for each canton (Bolliger et al. 2010: 39-40). 
The confidential data was quantified by means of in-depth document analyses and quantitative 
coding of anonymized disability insurance case files. Inter-rater reliability was tested through 
two rounds of secondary coding of randomly drawn subsamples by a different coder, resulting 
in subsequent iterative adaptations of the coding scheme and recoding of some variables. The 
analyzed documents include the full written documentation of each procedure, including 
memoranda; letters by applicants, clerks and other involved persons; reports and expertise by 
medical experts or treating doctors, employers, lawyers, other insurances, and social assistance 
officers, both the regional medical service and independent medical observation centers; 
reports by reintegration experts and professional advisors; and official disability insurance 
orders. Our very detailed data bears distinct advantages to prior studies relying on experimental 
data (Pierce et al. 2014). The allocation of disability benefits is a very lengthy process that 
involves many different actors. An experimental design cannot cover this complexity of 
interactions. In addition, this data allows us to make claims about how street-level bureaucrats 
actually perceive different ethnic groups (see detailed measures below). Yet, this significant 
gain in internal validity simultaneously reduces external validity. 
In what follows, we describe our measures for the social construction of target groups and its 
consequences as defined earlier (overview and descriptive statistics see Table A1, online 
appendix).  
Dependent measures 
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The duration of the procedure in days is our first, procedure-related dependent variable. Our 
second dependent variable measures the outcome of the procedure as a binary variable (0=no 
pension, 1=pension entitlement).4  Finally, a crucial variable is the objective evaluation of an 
applicant’s incapacity to work as a result of the different medical and reintegration 
assessments, following purely legally criteria. To obtain this evaluation, the disability 
insurance office distracts the earned income that remains after accounting for the health damage 
and the undertaken professional reintegration measures, from the income that could be earned 
without health damage (the “validity income”). The difference, expressed in per cent of the 
validity income, is the so-called “degree of disability” which, legally speaking, forms the sole 
basis for calculating the benefits for the applicants (Informationsstelle AHV/IV and Bundesamt 
für Sozialversicherungen 2008). As a dependent measure, it represents one outcome of the 
procedure; as an independent measure, it helps us clarify the degree to which social 
constructions matter for benefit allocation once this objective assessment is controlled for. 
Power and deservingness indicators 
For assessing the objective social construction of target groups, we rely on four basic 
indicators. The deservingness of groups is primarily based upon an individual’s nationality. 
Immigrants are defined here as non-Swiss citizens, who are further distinguished as immigrants 
from the former Yugoslavia (European immigrants) or Turkey (non-European immigrants). 
We expect that nationality is the main factor driving an unequal treatment of welfare applicants, 
based on a frontline worker’s cognitive evaluation of immigrant status and the associated 
stereotypes. As to the mental health status of an applicant, a diagnosed mental health issue 
                                                 
4 The actual degree of pension allocation varies between no, quarter, half, or full pension. However, in the present 
sample almost no one received a quarter or half pension. Accordingly, we dichotomized this indicator.  
16 
 
should indicate greater perceived deservingness. Age captures both deservingness and power. 
The last indicator, educational attainment, exclusively captures the power dimension.    
The in-depth coding allowed us to additionally obtain fine-grained information about the 
perceptions of the frontline workers involved, presented later in the empirical analysis. As the 
applicant files vary in size between eight and 147 documents, not all files comprise the same 
set of variables. This leads to a high number of missing values for these “subjective” variables.  
Method 
To analyze these data, we use different approaches. First, we validate and empirically identify 
the social construction of welfare applicants of our cases through a k-means cluster analysis 
based on the above-presented four power and deservingness measures. In contrast to standard 
cluster analysis, the k-means algorithm is a theory-driven approach which defines the number 
of clusters a priori. This cluster method is the most appropriate way of finding clusters in our 
data that reflect the social construction theory, with its four distinct ‘cells’.5 In a second step, 
we assess if this social construction has an influence on both the duration and the actual 
outcome of the procedure. The potential impact on all three dependent variables is tested by 
multiple regression analyses – linear models testing the influences on the duration and the 
evaluation of the incapacity to work, and logit models explaining the differences in the 
probability of receiving a pension. Given that our analysis is based on a rather small, non-
representative sample, we implement a Bayesian estimation approach. This method performs 
                                                 
5 K-means clustering is widely used and studied to minimize a formal objective function (Kanungo et al. 2002, 
881). Its algorithm finds the closest mean for every observation in the data. Being closely related to the idea of 
principal component analyses, it is often referred to as prototype clustering. We additionally estimated a standard 
cluster analysis based on Euclidian distances which rendered almost identical results (not shown here).  
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better than frequentist approaches when basic stochastic assumptions are violated (sample 
cannot be drawn indefinitely) or the number of observations is small (Jackman 2009).6    
Results 
We first analyze whether our assumption holds that applicants’ deservingness is mainly a 
function of their nationality. To this end, we empirically determine the applicants’ actual 
positions as suggested by Schneider et al. (2014). We then proceed to the explanatory analysis. 
Social construction in Swiss disability benefit allocation  
 Figure 1 presents the results of the k-means cluster analysis, revealing a four-group structure 
in our data using the allocation of a welfare benefit as indicator for actual deservingness.7 The 
displayed positions of the clusters reflect the mean-values of the observed variables within each 
cluster. The upper-right quadrant is empty as we have only three naturalized immigrants in our 
sample. Unsurprisingly, elderly and well-educated Swiss citizens constitute the advantaged 
group (N=12). Contrary to our expectations, Swiss citizens may also be seen as undeserving: 
                                                 
6 Contrary to frequentist approaches, Bayesian inference makes posterior probability statements instead of distinct 
statements about coefficient estimates. Bayesian analysis relies on a probability based approach that updates a 
priori assumptions about the phenomenon at hand by means of given data which results in informative probability 
assumptions – the posterior probability. Other than standard frequentist approaches, there is no need to fulfill a 
minimum number of cases or a specific data generation process (Jackman 2009). 
7 We additionally tested the group structure using latent class factor analysis (not shown here), with very similar 
results to the cluster analysis. Furthermore, we tested two-group and three-group solutions against the presented 
four-group solution. The four-group solution always achieved the best results.  
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diametrically opposed to the advantaged group, we find the deviants, who are (rather) young 
Swiss and immigrants from the former Yugoslavia without mental health issues (N=37). The 
group of older immigrants – both from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey – who have a low-
level education, but were diagnosed with mental health issues, ranges somewhere between the 
deviants and dependents categories (N=25). Unexpectedly, we cannot confirm that European 
and non-European immigrants differ in their deservingness. The last cluster comprises the 
dependents, who are rather low-educated, medium aged Swiss citizens with diagnosed mental 
health issues (N=12). The dependents have a higher deservingness than the advantaged, 
indicated by their position on the far-left.  
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
In sum, Figure 1 supports our assumption that immigration status is the main factor dividing 
the deserving from the undeserving. We now further test the implications of these constructions 
with the help of regression analysis.  
Explanatory analysis 
To address our expectations, we first take a look at cross-tabulations between our main 
variables of interest and immigrants (Table 1), before we estimate Bayesian regression models 
which test the influence of the above presented deservingness and power variables on the 
procedure and its outcomes (see Tables 2 and 3)8 The results in Table 1 reveal that the mean 
                                                 
8 All models were calculated in Stata version 14.2 (bayesmh) using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
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differences between Swiss and non-Swiss applicants are statistically significant for all three 
dependent measures, namely the duration of the allocation procedure, the evaluation of one’s 
incapacity to work as well as the allocation of disability benefits. The question, however, is if 
these findings hold, when we control for confounding factors.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
For an easy interpretation of the Bayesian estimation results, the mean and the 90% credible 
interval of the posterior distribution are provided. The mean is the average effect of the 
respective influence variable on the outcome variable, and the credible interval gives a sense 
of the statistical reliability of this estimate. If the credibility interval does not include zero, we 
speak of relevant coefficients, which corresponds to significant coefficients in frequentist 
terms. Model 1 in Table 2 reveals, first, that an applicant’s educational level and whether the 
respondent is an immigrant from the former Yugoslavian states decisively influences the 
duration of the application procedure. For this immigrant group, the application procedure can 
take 138 to 714 days longer than for Swiss applicants. Having a medium level of education 
compared to a low educational level significantly shortens the duration of the procedure, on 
                                                 
estimation (20,000 iterations, burn-in 5,000). As fully Bayesian analyses require the specification of priors for all 
unknown parameters, we used normal informative priors based on subjective selection for coefficients (for more 
details on this kind prior selection see Berger (1993)) and (conjugate) inverse gamma priors, 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2, ~ Γ−1 (𝜖𝜖, 𝜖𝜖) with 
𝜖𝜖 set to 0.001 for variance components (see Stegmueller 2013). No signs of non-convergence were detected. All 
models show a good acceptance rate and efficiency. Additional to these Bayesian models, we estimated standard 
regression models (see Table A4, online appendix) which yield very similar results.  
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average by 410 days. To capture the conflict potential of the procedure, we added the 
disagreement between doctors and the IV officer on either the applicant’s health status or his 
incapacity to work to model 1. Unsurprisingly, a higher disagreement on the health and 
incapacity status of the applicant may prolong the overall duration of the procedure by 43 to 
387 days. While having mental health issues shows a negative effect, it fails to be relevant for 
explaining the duration of the procedure. The same applies to the age effect. Overall, these 
results support our expectation that immigrant status plays a role in the allocation procedure 
of welfare benefits. Even when controlling for a lack of clarity about the applicant’s capacity 
to work and health status, being from the former Yugoslavia prolongs the whole procedure. As 
expected, both deservingness and power matter.  
Model 2 assesses the influence on the evaluation of the incapacity to work. Being a Turkish 
immigrant has a relevant impact on this objective measure of deservingness as a result of the 
evaluations performed during the procedure. The same goes for age, which is unsurprising, as 
younger applicants can more easily be reintegrated into the labor market. Overall, the first two 
models confirm our expectations: the more powerful European immigrants face more 
contentious procedures, whereas non-European immigrants are seen as less deserving. 
Table 3 presents our findings concerning the allocation of a disability pension.9 Model 3 shows 
that being a Turkish immigrant makes a relevant difference for receiving a partial or full 
pension compared to Swiss natives. Conversely, the chances of immigrants from the former 
Yugoslavia to receive a disability pension does not differ from those of a Swiss applicant. 
                                                 
9 Given the procedural nature of the presented models in Table 2 and 3, a path model could be appropriate here. 
We estimated additional SEM models which, however, did not render satisfying or relevant results. A plausible 
reason is that the models had too less observation for too many parameters.   
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Importantly, model 4 controls for the evaluation of the incapacity to work, which should be the 
only factor that determines the calculation of a pension according to law. Here, immigration 
background should no longer play a relevant role.  
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Yet we observe in model 4 that even when controlling for the objective assessment of disability, 
being a Turkish immigrant still lowers the probability of receiving a pension. Conversely, being 
diagnosed with mental health issues enhances the probability of receiving a pension: these are 
particularly needy clients. It is not surprising that the officer’s evaluation of the applicant’s 
degree of disability explains the largest part of the observed variance in the dependent variable 
– so it should. Last, the results for age and education do not show a clear direction.10 This 
supports our assumption that non-European immigrants will be least likely to receive a pension 
– even if we control for the objective application of the legal disability criteria. In sum, all four 
models reveal an unequal treatment of immigrants in the procedure and outcome of disability 
benefits. These results hold even when accounting for objective, procedure-specific indicators.  
One relevant feature of the presented results is that our sample comprises almost only 
presumably powerless, that is non-naturalized, immigrants. Naturalization is only possible after 
12 years of residing in Switzerland. To realistically assess the social construction of immigrant 
groups in Switzerland, it is more meaningful to take into consideration the degree of their 
                                                 
10 We further tested potential interactive relationships between nationality and the other measures (age, education, 
mental health, years having lived in Switzerland), but could not find any relevant interactive relationship between 
these. Moreover, there could be a curvilinear effect of years having lived in Switzerland. Additional models 
including this effect did not reveal any significant or relevant results.  
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integration as a potential power indicator. The time the applicant has been living in Switzerland 
approximates this. In our sample, the immigrant applicants have been living in Switzerland 
between 8 and 59 years, and 22 years on average. Table 4 presents estimates for the subgroup 
of immigrants, including the above variables and the additional integration measure. Both the 
duration and the allocation of benefits are regressed on these indicators.  
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Looking at model 4, we may conclude that education as well as the time the immigrant-
applicant has been living in Switzerland relevantly diminish the overall duration of the 
procedure. The fifth model shows that both the time spent in Switzerland and having mental 
health issues determine the probability of receiving a pension. Yet, being Turkish or from the 
former Yugoslavia no longer makes a relevant difference in both models. What these results 
suggest is that the observed differences between the two immigrant groups are mainly a 
function of their power and deservingness, not of nationality per se. Their degree of integration 
into Swiss society could in fact indicate both, since it also affects the perceived outgroup status. 
Until now, we addressed only how objective measures influence the allocation of benefits, but 
not how frontline workers perceive specific groups – that is, the actual social construction that 
underlies these results. We now implement measures representing the subjective perception 
and evaluation by the IV officers and medical experts of perceived differences. 11 Indicators 
                                                 
11 Note that these indicators constitute perceptions of the welfare workers involved in the evaluations, rather than 
objective facts or behaviors of the applicants. Empirical analyses have shown that the share of immigrant 
recipients of disability benefits is attributable to the equally twice as high share of immigrant applicants, rather 
than to the procedure itself. There is no empirical evidence that immigrants have an objectively higher tendency 
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for deservingness are (1) perceived existence of non-verifiable pain symptoms; (2) perceived 
tendency to express mental stress as physical symptoms; (3) the suspicion of simulated 
symptoms. We can further illustrate the complexity and contentiousness of the procedure with 
measures of (4) the number of doctors consulted; (5) the  number of documents in the file; (6) 
the involvement of a lawyer in the procedure; (7) whether the applicant issued a complaint or 
objection in court; (8) experts’ disagreement about the applicant’s health status; (9) experts’ 
disagreement about the applicant’s capacity to work; and (10) the disagreement between 
applicant and IV officer on the applicant’s capacity to work. A descriptive analysis and 
comparisons between our three nationality groups illustrate these subjectively perceived 
evaluations of the applicants and the complexity and contentiousness of the procedures. This 
analysis may clarify the above observed biased treatments of Swiss citizens and immigrants in 
the allocation procedure and outcome of disability benefits. Table 5 shows the average values 
and mean percentages for these variables, and the statistical significance between the three 
groups.  
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
In line with the above analyses, we find a very strong tendency of immigrants being socially 
constructed as more suspicious and, thus, as less deserving than Swiss applicants in the eyes 
of the medical actors and insurance employees involved in the procedure. Immigrant applicants 
are considerably more often perceived to express psychological issues, like stress, through 
                                                 
to cheat or simulate (Bolliger et al. 2010).  
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physical symptoms (93 and 100 percent compared to 53 percent), to experience pain that does 
not have a verifiable cause (50 percent compared to 23 percent), or to report symptoms that do 
not seem to exist (30 and 37 percent compared to 0 percent). It is therefore much less clear 
whether immigrant applicants are truly suffering and responsible for their situations or not (i.e., 
needy). It is, however, clear that they are more often perceived to be overly complaining. 
Language issues and cultural patterns of communicating illness and pain play an important role 
in explaining these mechanisms that trigger social constructions (Bolliger et al. 2010).  If social 
construction mainly relies on immigrant status, the disability procedures should also be more 
complex, conflictual, and characterized by suspicion for undeserving target groups. This is 
indeed the case: the disability procedures of immigrants comprise more medical clarifications, 
larger file sizes, more disagreements between experts, more disagreements between the 
applicant and the IV officer, more lawyers involved in the process, and more legal complaints 
or objections than those of Swiss applicants.  
Discussion  
Our findings offer a nuanced portrait of the biases in the decisions taken by frontline workers. 
The above results, regression and descriptive, support the general idea that target groups are 
socially constructed based on their deservingness and power. Nationality determines 
deservingness. It matters whether you are an immigrant or not; and it is important where you 
originally come from. Depending on these factors, the duration of the application procedure is 
shorter and you are more likely to receive a pension. Being an immigrant from the former 
Yugoslavian countries prolongs the application procedure. If you are an immigrant from 
Turkey, you are decisively less likely to receive a pension. These effects persist even if we 
control for the assessment according to objective, legal criteria – hence undermining the 
principle of equal treatment of welfare clients. However, the differences between immigrants 
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seem to be in large part a function of their power and deservingness, rather than simply of 
nationality. These stereotypes are reflected in the welfare workers’ perceptions of immigrants 
being more suspicious and less needy. They affect the contentiousness and complexity of the 
procedure. 
We cannot however, say that immigrants are per se, by law or policy design, disadvantaged in 
the disability procedure. Rather, all applicants undergo close scrutiny and ample evaluation. 
What we can say is that their perceived degree of deservingness and power influences how the 
legal criteria are applied. Overall, Swiss citizens who were diagnosed with mental health issues 
have the best chances to receive a disability pension. The prospects for immigrants from the 
former Yugoslavian states are more optimistic than those for Turkish applicants: while they 
often must endure a longer procedure, their probability of receiving a pension eventually does 
not differ from the general probability Swiss citizens have. 
Before discussing the implications of our results, we want to emphasize that these should be 
handled with care. Frontline decisions have manifold reasons other than social constructions 
(Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2012; Meyers et al. 2001; Scott 1997; Thomann 
2015; Tummers et al. 2015). Shortcomings of our dataset particularly affected the 
comparability of some indicators and meant many missing values on potential influences. Our 
sample also (deliberately) was not representative of the Swiss population, but of disability 
benefit applicants with a high likelihood to receive pensions. While this helped create a quasi-
most-similar system design, we are not able to draw any conclusions for groups outside of this 
sample. Future research should address similar questions in other European countries and 
concerning other social benefits and target groups, particularly women (Petersen et al. 2011). 
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Conclusions 
Our study adds to existing evidence of unequal treatment of target groups in welfare service 
delivery, often based on race. Stereotypes about immigrants may not only define who deserves 
help and who does not, but also who will ultimately receive it in modern European welfare 
states. The case of Switzerland is in many respects representative of current developments 
regarding immigration, anti-immigrant attitudes, and their political mobilization in Western 
Europe. While the implications of these developments for public opinion and party politics are 
relatively well-explored, this is less the case for administrative practices. 
Yet studies like ours point to an urgent truth: “it is of great convenience, both theoretically and 
practically, to assume that citizen A is the same as citizen B and that they both receive public 
services in equal measure. This assumption may be convenient, but it is obviously both illogical 
and empirically inaccurate” (Frederickson 1990, 228). As the notion of “feed-forward effects” 
entails (Pierce et al. 2014) and the recent policing crisis in the United States amply 
demonstrates, an unequal treatment of target groups by bureaucracies has wide-ranging 
consequences for democracy and society at large (Deleon and Weible 2010; Epp et al. 2017; 
Liang 2016; Piatak 2015). Discrimination in policy implementation has decisive impacts on 
both the attitudes and political behavior of the respective group and the public perception of 
this group. A biased treatment by policymakers and frontline workers sends distinct messages 
about the group’s position in society and their possibilities to integrate into society and change 
the status quo (Moynihan and Herd 2010). Immigrants, for example, may not seek the help of 
the police or courts and rely on self-justice instead as they may believe that they will not be 
heard based on their prior treatment by frontline workers and policymakers (Epp et al. 2017).      
The fact that stereotypes affect public action in the sphere of the presumably neutral and 
technocratic bureaucracy gains saliency as anti-immigration attitudes continue to be on the rise. 
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We have shown that even in a context of a very tight, “objective” legal criteria for welfare 
eligibility, in a controversial political climate and stressful environment, bureaucrats may treat 
some clients as more equal than others (Grohs, Adam, and Knill 2015). In this context, the 
political willingness to pay attention to a discriminatory treatment of immigrant welfare 
applicants is lacking. Rather, the findings by Bolliger et al. (2010, 5) were received politically 
as a sign that “the higher share of immigrant recipients is not caused by the allocation 
procedure”. Political contexts differ between countries: in August 2016, the British Prime 
Minister Theresa May, for instance, ordered the government to audit how public services treat 
people from different backgrounds in order to reveal racial disparities across the country’s 
public sector. 
Even in a context of political willingness for change, deeply rooted stereotypes are a difficult 
target for reform. Scholars point to the importance of law, management, education, and 
exhortation to achieve greater social equity in public service delivery (Deleon and Weible 
2010; Gooden and Portillo 2011; Johnson 2012). Simultaneously, research on frontline service 
delivery emphasizes how the need to cope with pressures from austerity and New Public 
Management can undermine these goals, forcing service deliverers to prioritize some clients 
over others (e.g., Danziger and Seefeldt 2003; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2012; Meyers et 
al. 2001; Thomann 2015; Tummers et al. 2015). We have shown that institutional-cultural 
differences to the welfare system of the United States do not mitigate the discrimination of 
immigrants in the Swiss case. Pessimistically speaking, our results raise fundamental questions 
concerning how the equal treatment of all welfare applicants can be guaranteed in such times. 
At best, our findings can raise the awareness of public managers and practitioners involved in 
both political and everyday decisions on the allocation of public resources towards vulnerable 
populations. In any case, our study suggests that social equity issues deserve more attention by 
scholars studying the policy implications of immigration in contemporary Europe.   
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Tables and Figures 
TABLE 1: Descriptive analysis – Differences between citizens and non-citizens 
 Swiss 
(N=48) 
non-Swiss 
(N=42) 
  
 mean sd mean sd F p 
Duration of procedure 940.67 664.28 1640.50 732.92 22.58 0.00 
Evaluation of incapacity to work 52.51 37.20 38.80 34.02 3.27 0.07 
Allocation of disability benefit 0.50 0.51 0.26 0.44 5.55 0.02 
Note: Group-comparisons/significance tests based on Sidak test statistics.  
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TABLE 2: Regression results – duration of allocation procedure and evaluation of incapacity 
to work  
 Model 1 
Duration of procedure 
Model 2 
Evaluation of incapacity to 
work 
 Mean 10% 90% Mean 10% 90% 
Deservingness       
Nationalitya       
former Yugoslavia 425.64 [138.08 714.25] -56.13 [-127.77 14.11] 
Turkey 113.39 [-323.72 562.91] -116.87 [-227.50 -4.56] 
Mental illness diagnosed -90.21 [-352.50 178.13] 19.41 [-49.03 87.57] 
Powerfulness       
Age -17.80 [-35.83 0.28] -12.48 [-16.99 -7.95] 
Educational level  -410.82 [-721.18 -104.87] -61.90 [-139.72 15.77] 
Procedure specific influence         
disagreement on health status 215.10 [43.50 387.38]    
Intercept 2470.35 [1673.92 3268.43] 19.41 [-49.03 87.57] 
N 86 85 
Note: a reference category Swiss; mean posterior distributions of linear and logistic Bayesian regression 
coefficients and 90 percent credibility intervals (in squared brackets). 
Bold: relevant coefficients.  
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TABLE 3: Regression results – outcome of allocation procedure  
 Model 3 
allocation of disability 
benefit 
Model 4 
allocation of disability 
benefit 
 Mean 10% 90% Mean 10% 90% 
Deservingness       
Nationalitya       
former Yugoslavia -0.54 [-1.50 0.40] -1.35 [-3.21 0.39] 
Turkey -2.49 [-4.95 -0.41] -4.44 [-7.45 -1.52] 
Mental illness diagnosed 1.59 [0.70 2.51] 2.11 [0.49 3.83] 
Power       
Age 0.11 [0.05 0.17] 0.04 [-0.06 0.14] 
Educational level  0.38 [-0.66 1.42] -1.05 [-2.92 0.73] 
Objective measure of incapacity       
Evaluation of incapacity to 
work 
   0.11 [0.07 0.15] 
Intercept -6.85 [-10.01 -3.85] -6.70 [-10.78 -2.73] 
N 85 85 
Note: a reference category Swiss; mean posterior distributions of linear and logistic Bayesian regression 
coefficients and 90 percent credibility intervals (in squared brackets).  
Bold: relevant coefficients.  
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TABLE 4: Results sub-group analysis – Immigrants only  
 Model 5 
Duration 
Model 6 
Allocation 
 Mean 10% 90% Mean 10% 90% 
Deservingness       
Ethnic groupa       
Turkey -119.78 [-668.10 431.99] 1.99 [-1.04 5.28] 
Mental illness diagnosed -264.16 [-627.95 102.22] 3.01 [1.22 5.04] 
Power       
Age 24.69 [-1.23 50.54] -0.03 [-0.18 0.11] 
Educational level  -401.29 [-746.23 -54.75] -0.77 [-2.65 1.00] 
Group-specific measures       
Years having lived in CH -40.18 [-62.52 -17.71] 0.23 [0.09 0.41] 
Intercept 2225.44 [1351.81 3107.72] -7.68 [-11.96 -3.49] 
N 34 34 
Note: a reference category Swiss; mean posterior distributions of linear and logistic Bayesian regression 
coefficients and 90 percent credibility intervals (in squared brackets).  
Bold: relevant coefficients.  
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TABLE 5: Descriptive analysis – Subjective perceptions of IV officers and medical experts   
 Swiss 
(N=48) 
Former-
Yugoslavian 
(N=32) 
Turkish 
(N=10) 
Credibility of symptoms and general suspicion    
(1) % of cases no verifiable source of physical pain 
symptoms was detected 
53.33%bc 93.75%a 100%a 
(2) % of cases no verifiable source of mental (stress) 
symptoms was detected 
23.81%b 50.00%a 50.00% 
(3) % of cases IV officer or expert suspect simulation  0.00%bc 30.00%a 37.50%a 
Complexity of procedure    
(4) Avg. number of doctors consulted 2.02b 3.31a 2.6 
(5) Avg. number of file documents 38.94b 57.43a 43.00 
Contentiousness of procedure    
(6) % of cases lawyer was involved 14.58%bc 70.96%a 50.00%a 
(7) % of cases complaints or objections were mentioned 25.00%b 53.13%a 40.00% 
(8) % of cases disagreement between experts on health 
status was encountered 
20.45%b 48.15%a 40.00% 
(9) % of cases disagreement between experts on work 
capacity was encountered 
57.78% 71.88% 60.00% 
(10) % of cases disagreement on work capacity between 
applicant and IV officer were encountered 
12.50%c 33.33% 66.66%a 
Note: a significant difference to native Swiss group; b significant difference to Yugoslavian group; c significant 
difference to Turkish group. Group-comparisons/significance tests based on Sidak test statistics.  
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FIGURE 1: Social construction – Results from cluster analysis 
  
Note: Approximated positions of clusters.  
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Appendix 
TABLE A1: Variables, operationalization and descriptive statistics 
Variable Stats Operationalization 
Outcome variables 
 
  
Duration of procedure Min=44 
Max=2516 
Mean=1267.23 
Sd=777.02 
Days from the start to the end of the 
application procedure, i.e. final decision 
taken. Ongoing applications were coded 
with the maximum number of days.  
Evaluation of invalidity Min=0 
Max=100 
Mean=45.78 
Sd=36.47 
Evaluation of IV office of applicant’s 
capacity to work at end of procedure / 
after 4 years. Measured as difference 
between validity income and earned 
income considering health damage and 
reintegration efforts, in % of validity 
income. High values indicate high 
incapacity to work. 
Receiving partial or full 
pension  
Min=0 
Max=1 
Mean=0.39 
Sd=0.49 
Entitlement of invalidity pension after 
decision was taken. 
0= receiving no pension 
1=receiving partial or full pension 
Influence variables  See table 1, 2, and 3 
   
Nationality Swiss=51.16% 
Former Yugoslavia=37.21 
Turkish=11.63% 
1 = Swiss  
2 = Ex-Yugoslavia 
3 = Turkey 
Age Min=35 
Max=59 
Mean=48.48 
Sd=6.88 
Age in years  
Educational level Low education=46.67% 
Medium education=53.33% 
1=low education 
2=medium level education 
Mental health issues Yes=45.35% 
No=54.65% 
Mental health issues were diagnosed at 
the beginning of the procedure. 
0=no mental health issue 
1=mental health issue 
Ethnic group Immigrant=50% 
Native=50% 
0=immigrant 
1=native Swiss 
Evaluation of invalidity Min=0 
Max=100 
Mean=45.78 
Sd=36.47 
Evaluation of IV office of applicant’s 
capacity to work at end of procedure / 
after 4 years. Measured as difference 
between validity income and earned 
income considering health damage and 
reintegration efforts, in % of validity 
income. High values indicate high 
incapacity to work. 
Disagreement on health status 
or work capacity between 
experts 
Yes=63.33% 
No=36.67% 
Disagreement on health condition or 
disagreement on incapacity to work.  
0=no disagreement 
1=disagreement on health or incapacity 
Integration in Switzerland Min=0 
Max=100 
Mean=45.78 
Sd=36.47 
Years the applicant has been living in 
Switzerland (only immigrants) 
 
Additional indicators for descriptive analysis 
 
See Table 4  
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Variable Stats Operationalization 
Number of doctors consulted Min=0 
Max=7 
Mean= 2.54 
Sd=1.62 
Number of doctors consulted 
Number of documents in 
applicant file 
Min=8 
Max=147 
Mean= 45.97 
Sd= 23.93 
Number of documents in applicant file 
Lawyer  Yes=38.20% 
No=61.80% 
Lawyer was involved 
0=no 
1=yes 
Applicant issued complaint or 
objection at court 
 
Yes=36.67% 
No=63.33% 
Applicant issued complaint or objection 
at court 
0=no 
1=yes 
No verifiable source of 
mental (stress) symptoms  
Yes=35.90% 
No=64.10% 
Perception that applicant has somatoform 
stress disorder  
0=no 
1=yes 
No verifiable pain Yes=73.26% 
No=26.74% 
Applicant experiences pain symptoms 
that do not seem to have a clearly 
verifiable physical cause 
0=no 
1=yes 
Suspicion of simulation Yes=13.95% 
No=86.05% 
Insurance employees suspect that 
applicant simulates or exaggerates 
symptoms 
0=no 
1=yes 
Disagreement on health status 
between experts 
Yes=32.10 % 
No= 67.90% 
Disagreement on health status between 
experts 
0=no 
1=yes 
Disagreement on work 
capacity between experts 
Yes=63.22% 
No=36.76% 
Disagreement on work capacity between 
experts 
0=no 
1=yes 
Discrepancy in self-
assessment and objective 
assessment of capacity to 
work 
Yes=24.66% 
No=75.34% 
Applicant’s assessment of own capacity 
to work differs from assessment by 
medical experts or insurance employees 
0=no 
1=yes 
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TABLE A2: Influences on disagreement between medical experts 
 Disagreement 
 Mean 10% 90% 
Deservingness    
Nationalitya    
former Yugoslavia 1.17 [0.27 2.11] 
Turkey 0.62 [-0.73 2.02] 
Mental illness diagnosed 0.65 [-0.17 1.47] 
Power    
Age 0.05 [-0.01 0.10] 
Educational level  0.18 [-0.77 1.15] 
Intercept -2.66 [-5.39 -0.04] 
N 86 
Note: a reference category Swiss; mean posterior distributions of linear and logistic Bayesian regression 
coefficients and 90 percent credibility intervals (in squared brackets); both models were calculated in Stata version 
14.2 (bayesmh) using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation (20,000 iterations, burn-in 5,000, 
informative priors for coefficients and (informative) gamma priors for variance components); no signs of non-
convergence were detected; good acceptance rate and efficiency.  
Bold: relevant coefficients.  
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TABLE A3: Overview over group differences between Swiss citizens and immigrants (former 
Yugoslavian and Turkish combined) 
 Swiss citizen immigrant p-value 
Education 1.70 1.33 0.00* 
income in CHF 3993 4230 0.46 
evaluation of integration into Swiss society 0.82 0.66 0.11 
having had problems with the law 0.35 0.24 0.24 
drug addiction/alcohol problem 0.38 0.24 0.21 
marital status 2.25 2.05 0.11 
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TABLE A4: Standard regression results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Duration of 
procedure 
Evaluation of 
incapacity to work 
Allocation of 
disability 
benefit 
Deservingness    
Nationalitya    
former Yugoslavia 388.27** -2.99 -1.14 
 (164.19) (8.11) (1.19) 
Turkey 51.76 -10.84 -3.87* 
 (259.67) (13.13) (2.03) 
Mental illness diagnosed -100.28 17.99** 1.83* 
 (144.10) (7.27) (1.01) 
Powerfulness    
Age -23.36** 1.68*** 0.06 
 (11.17) (0.56) (0.08) 
Educational level -446.40** 7.19 -1.03 
 (169.66) (8.69) (1.21) 
Procedure specific influence      
disagreement on health status 215.99**   
 (92.02)   
Evaluation of incapacity to work   0.09*** 
   (0.02) 
Intercept 2822.36*** -51.81* -6.62* 
 (548.57) (27.90) (3.90) 
N 86 85 85 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01; linear regression methods were implemented for 
both duration of the procedure and evaluation of the incapacity to work models, logistic regressions were used for 
allocation of disability benefit model.  
 
 
 
 
